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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate change has been a security issue for mankind since
Homo sapiens first emerged on the planet, driving him to
find new and better food, water, shelter, and basic resources
for survival and the advancement of civilization. Only
recently, however, has the rate of climate change coupled
with man’s knowledge of his own role in that change
accelerated, perhaps profoundly, changing the security
paradigm. If we take a ―decades‖ look at the security issue,
we see competition for natural resources giving way to Cold
War ideological containment and deterrence, itself giving
way to non-state terrorism and extremism. While we
continue to defend against these threats, we are faced with
even greater security challenges that inextricably tie
economic, food and human security together and where the
flash points may not provide clearly discernable causes, as
they will be intrinsically tied to climate change.
Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest
development gains that can be realized by some regions
could be reversed by climate change. This means that
climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat
as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental
disaster that is unfolding. As such, addressing climate
change has become central to the development and poverty
reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions.
In Latin America, poorer countries and communities, such as
those found in Central America, will suffer the hardest
because of weaker resilience and greater reliance on climatesensitive sectors such as agriculture. The US should attempt
to deliver capability to assist these states to deal with the
effects of climate change.

1

INTRODUCTION
In the past, the common symptoms of human environmental
impact have been urban-industrial air pollution, chemically
polluted waterways and the manifestations of urban squalor
in both rich and poor countries. These local hazards are now
being supplemented with those due to changes in some of the
planet’s great biophysical and ecological systems, and hence
there are additional and larger-scale impacts. This impact,
due significantly to climate change, has influenced the
functioning of many ecosystems, the seasonal cycles, and
geographic range of plants and creatures1, thus affecting food
production and water availability. These ―at risk‖ ecosystems
provide society with a number of goods (e.g., food, fiber,
fuel, pharmaceutical products) and services that are essential
to human health and well-being, and form the basis of our
modern economies. Climate change is, therefore, seen not
just as an environmental threat, but a threat that is crosscutting and can affect all of the key economic sectors. 2
Climate change will, in many countries result in large scale
starvation, as previously productive agricultural areas dry up
or become inundated by flooding. This could in turn lead to
mass migrations and deaths of a scale never before seen. In
fact, it would be much larger than the Irish migration due to
the potato blight in the 1840s, where nearly two million
people—a quarter of Ireland’s population then-- migrated to
the U.S. Additionally, diseases will become more prevalent
in many areas and, due to the global interconnectedness of
modern society, will spread rapidly from nation to nation. As
countries fight to control disease and migration, others will
1

Susan Hassol, Impacts of a warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press) 2004.
2
Anthony Nyong, ―Climate-Related Conflicts in West Africa,‖
Environmental Change and Security Program Report, Issue 12,
(Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development) 20062007.
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be seeking to relieve the pressure through exploitation of
new areas of natural resources, causing increased border
incursions/disputes and conflict.
Addressing climate change through stand-alone projects will
not achieve the desired outcomes because of its cross-cutting
nature. Therefore, the optimum strategy calls for a
mainstreaming approach, where climate change concerns are
integrated into programs and projects of development banks
and other international institutions, as well as into
governmental developmental planning and security
processes. Additionally, military and national security
experts must understand climate change and its root causes
in order to identify potential routes to conflict and those
interagency development programs that mitigate that threat.
In a 2007 publication titled, “National Security and the
Threat of Climate Change,” the CNA Corporation’s Military
Advisory Board set the stage for future military studies in
climate change, by stating the following:
Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are greater
now than at any time in the past 650,000 years, and
the average global temperature has continued a
steady rise. This rise presents the prospect of
significant climate change, and while uncertainty
exists, and debate continues regarding the science
and future extent of projected climate changes, the
trends are clear.
The nature and pace at which climate change is
being observed today and the consequences projected
by the consensus scientific opinion are grave and
pose equally grave implications for our national
security. Moving beyond the arguments of cause-andeffect, it is important that the US military begin
planning to address these potentially devastating
effects. The consequences of climate change can
affect the organization, in terms of training,
3

equipping, and planning of the military services. The
US military has a clear obligation to determine the
potential impacts of climate change on its ability to
execute its mission in support of national security
objectives.
Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for
instability in some of the most volatile regions of the
world, and it presents significant national security
challenges for the United States. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to start now to help mitigate the severity
of some of these emerging challenges. The decision to
act should be made soon in order to plan prudently
for the nation’s security. 3
This paper identifies the current issues in climate change and
focuses on Central American countries that are most at risk
of developing profound security challenges. It looks first at
the scientific basics of greenhouse gases, and their effects
and consequences. It then documents current agreements
and protocols that in and of themselves may spawn
international conflict. Finally, it identifies some emerging
policies and economic incentives for potential mitigation of
challenges that countries in Central America will face as a
result of climate change.
GREENHOUSE EFFECT
Since the earth’s natural “Greenhouse effect” was first
described in 1824 by the French physicist, Joseph Fourier,
scientists have documented that fossil fuel burning and other
industrial activities have been emitting billions of tons of
global warming emissions. Most of the short wavelength
radiation (high energy) coming from the sun are absorbed by
the earth’s surface. However, some of this radiation is reemitted as long wavelength (infrared) radiation, (Heat).
3

Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change, (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, April 2007).
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Greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere allow short
wavelength radiation to pass through to the earth’s surface,
but trap much of the reflected long wavelength radiation
causing what is called the ―Greenhouse effect‖ or global
warming.
Figure 1: A Schematic Illustration of the Greenhouse
Effect4

The potential cause and focus in recent years has been on
―global warming‖ but more recently the terminology has
shifted to ―climate change.‖ Scientist disagree on whether
―manmade‖ global warming has set off the current global
warming trend, or whether we are really on the verge of the
4

"The Greenhouse Effect & Greenhouse Gases," Windows to the
Universe,
http://www.windows2universe.org/earth/climate/greenhouse_effect_gase
s.html.
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next great Ice Age. Rather than enter the political and
philosophical debates, this paper assumes that greenhouse
gases are significantly impacting the environment and
causing rapid variations in the climate. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
projected a globally averaged warming of about 0.3 to 0.4 oF
per decade for a range of scenarios of GHG emissions over
the next 20 years. The total temperature increase between
1850–1899 and 2001–2005 reached 0.76 °C. In fact, 5 of 21
IPCC models projected that the average warming will exceed
7.2oF by the end of the century with the largest warming in
the US expected to occur during winter over northern
Alaska. These warming trends vary geographically and
further play into the dramatic climate discourse. The
temperature of the world’s oceans has also been rising, and
mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined in both
hemispheres. All these phenomena contribute to an average
global sea level rise of 1.8 mm per year from 1961 to 2003,
and at a faster rate – about 3.1 mm from 1993 to 2003. The
scientists5 have agreed that emissions have to be limited to
44 Gtonne CO2e by 2020 to stay on a 2 degree limitation
course. Based on the Copenhagen Accord pledges, the
emissions in 2020 could be 49 Gtonne under a good
scenario, but as high as 53 Gtonne (almost like business-asusual) in the bad scenario.6
GHGs, as defined in the Kyoto Protocol, consist primarily of
six gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Since pre-industrial
times, the atmospheric concentration of GHGs has grown
significantly with carbon dioxide concentration increasing by
about 31%, methane by about 150% and nitrous oxide by
5

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: Synthesis, Island Press, Washington, DC.
6
World Bank, "Climate Change by the Numbers" 2003,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI0
8_section3_intro.pdf.
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about 16%.7 The fluorinated compounds, although present in
relatively much lower concentrations in the global
atmosphere when compared with carbon dioxide and
methane, have significantly larger global warming potentials
(GWP) of up to 22,000 times greater than that of carbon
dioxide and methane, which have GWPs of 1 and 23
respectively. GWP is a basis for comparing each gas’s ability
to trap heat. Furthermore, hydro-fluorocarbons have seen the
highest percentage increase in concentration since 1998. 8
Table 1 shows the sources of greenhouse gases and the
global warming potential of each gas.

7

Luis M. Galindo, Carlos de Miguel, and Jimy Ferrer, "Vital Climate
Change Graphics for Latin America and the Caribbean (2010) - Maps
and Graphics at UNEP/GRID-Arendal," Maps and Graphics at
UNEP/GRID-Arendal, June 2010,
http://www.grida.no/_res/site/file/publications/LAC_Web_eng_2011-0103.pdf.
8
Lenny Bernstein, et al., Climate Change 2007:Synthesis Report, IPCC,
November 2007.
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Table 1: Source of Greenhouse Gases and their Global
Warming Potential
Name

Symbol

Common Sources

GWP

Carbon Dioxide

CO2

1

Methane

CH4

Nitrous Oxide

N2O

Hydrofluorocarbons

HFCs

Fossil Fuel
Combustion
Forest Clearing
Industrial
Production
Processes
Landfills
Natural Gas
Production
Fermentation From
Livestock
Soil Management
Fossil Fuel
Combustion
Fertilizers
(production and
application )
Refrigeration Gases

Perfluorocarbon

PFCs

Sulfur
Hexafluoride

SF6

Semiconductor
Manufacturing
Aluminum
Production
Semiconductor
Industry
Electrical
Transmission
Systems
Magnesium
Production
8

25

298

14011,700

7,850

23,900

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Predictions by climate models of the GHGs influence on
global temperature increase and various other environmental
indicators prompted the formation of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.9 The Kyoto
Protocol was adopted by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCCC) in 1997 to
reduce emissions by an average of 5% by the period 20082012. To date, 186 countries have ratified the convention.
The U.S. did not choose to become a signatory to the
protocol although it is a signatory to the UNFCCC, placing
the U.S. outside of the international norm.10
The Kyoto Protocol was outlined to make the convention
operational in 1997, whereby 39 developed countries (Annex
1 countries) made legally binding commitments to reduce
their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% relative to 1990
to be achieved by 2008 -2012: the so called ―First
Commitment Period.‖11 Countries without targets (nonAnnex 1 countries) can receive investments from Annex 1
countries by hosting Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
projects.
The Kyoto Protocol established a belief that a wealthy
minority of the world's countries and corporations are the
principal cause of climate change. The foundation of further
global climate justice movements stem from this and further
believe the adverse effects of climate change fall first and
foremost on the developing nations that suffer the greatest
percentage of the global poverty. The provisions for this
Protocol end December 2012 and hence the push for a
9

Ibid.
Galindo L., op. cit.
11
Ben H. de Jong, et al., ―Greenhouse gas mitigation potential of
combining forest management and bioenergy substitution: A case study
from Central Highlands of Michoacán, Mexico.‖ Forest Ecology and
Management 30 April 2007: p. 398-411.
10

9

continuation at the United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 and again in
Cancun in 2010.
The debacle of the Copenhagen Accord12 is a direct result of
the fact that developing countries (led by China) and
communities are unlikely to ignore the wealthy nation’s
historical responsibility for the causes and consequences of
climate change. They also perceive that the wealthy minority
continues to consume an excessive proportion of the Earth's
limited environmental space. Furthermore, there appears to
be some resentment and mistrust of proposals, if adopted,
which would lock developing countries into low and rapidly
decreasing per-capita shares, denying them the
environmental space needed to build the houses, schools,
roads and infrastructure that developed countries possess.
Such proposals are deemed to deepen the debt of developed
countries rather than honoring it, leveraging past injustices
into a future climate regime, and proposing a system in
which the "polluter profits" and the "poor pays" for the
excessive historical and current consumption of the rich
countries.13 In fact, President Evo Morales of Bolivia, hosted
his own Climate Change Conference in April 2010 to further
push similar ideas and challenge the UN, and more
importantly, the US.
On a global scale, China and the United States are the largest
and second largest overall contributors to global warming at
24% and 22%, respectively. However, in respect to per
capita and per GNP, the United States far exceeds the rest of
the world (see Figure 2). This spurs the grand debate of who
pays for the impact.

12

Hassol S., op. cit.
World Bank, "Climate Change by the Numbers" 2003,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI0
8_section3_intro.pdf.
13
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Figure 2: Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions per
Capita and per GNP14

At the IFCCC Cancun 2010, the US had two goals: reinforce
an international agreement on climate change that entails
comparable efforts from all major GHG emitters, and avoid
being blamed if the talks are seen to fail. However, China
was a critical barrier to achieving both goals because it
continues to demand that all developed countries including
the US, adopt legally binding international obligations to cut

14

"Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions per Capita and per GNP,"
Gapminder: Unveiling the beauty of statistics for a fact based world
view, http://www.gapminder.org.
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their own emissions, while insisting that all others, including
China, be exempt.15
The inability of the US administration to make a meaningful
commitment to reduce its emissions to an adequate extent
has been problematic. In fact, it is now clear that Congress
will not adopt a comprehensive climate bill. As such, other
developed countries are reluctant to honor their own
commitments, or even retain the existing regulated system.
Furthermore, Russia and Japan have openly indicated a
reluctance to continue with the Kyoto Protocol, due to the
non-involvement of the US. Other major developing
countries have also shown a reluctance to adhere to the
binding disciplines. The Vice Minister and senior climate
negotiator of Japan has been quoted as saying, ―Japan will
not agree to extend Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 even if it
means isolating itself at the UN‖. Australia, New Zealand
and Canada, among others, have also been unwilling or
reluctant to commit to Kyoto's second period. That leaves the
European Union, which although it has said that it would
prefers to shift to a new system, is still open to remaining in
the Kyoto Protocol, if others do. Only Norway has firmly
agreed to a second Kyoto Protocol period.
CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The major anticipated impacts of climate change are on
agriculture and food security, forest composition, health and
productivity, water resources, coastal erosion and inundation,
modification of biodiversity, and eco-systems. Temperatures
are projected to raise an additional 2-5oF in the 21st Century
producing heat waves, storms, floods, hurricanes and rising
sea levels due to melting glaciers.16 Due to geographical and
15

Brian M. Fagan, loods fa ines and e perors l Ni o and the fate
of civilizations, (New York, NY: Basic Books), 1999.
16
Lenny Bernstein, et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, IPCC
November 2007.
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climatic variances, the temperature rise varies by region.
Vulnerable regions in both the northern and southern
hemisphere will bear the brunt of the effect of climate
change. NASA satellite images have revealed that a
significant amount of Arctic ice has disappeared to about
half of what it was five years ago. Greenland’s ice sheet has
lost almost 19 billion tonnes of its volume, which prompted
climate scientist Jay Zwally to remark, ―At this rate, the
Arctic Ocean could be nearly ice-free by 2012‖.17 This may
present both a more traditional security threat, as nations
such as Russia, race to claim the opening oil and seabed
riches, as well as control the Northwest Passage, which could
reignite and expand a regional risk, as well as a climate
change risk of enormous proportions. The conditions of life
on Earth have already been altered, even as we remain
largely ignorant of the long-term consequences on
biodiversity.18 The opening of the Arctic Passage would have
a huge economic effect on the Panama because, if it remains
open all year long, it would offer a shorter route sea transport
and obviates the need for usage of the Panama Canal. This
would have a tremendous impact to Panama’s economy.
Central America is already experiencing adverse effects of
climate change. This include sea level rise, temperature
increases, predicted water shortages and other related
phenomena such as increased tropical cyclones/hurricanes,
coral bleaching, among others, as will be discussed below.

17

Seth Borenstein, ―Artic Sea Ice Gone in Summer within Five Years?‖
National Geographic News, Washington Associated Press, 12 December
2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/12/071212-AParctic-melt.html.
18
Richard M. Adams and Dannele E. Peck. "Drought and Climate
Change: Implications For The West." Western Economics Forum 1.2
(2002): 14-19. AgEcon Search,
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/27990.
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CENTRAL AMERICA:
INCREASE
Rise in Sea Level

EFFECT OF TEMPERATURE

Central American countries all have in common socioeconomic challenges. Among these are: a heavy dependence
upon the natural resource base (agriculture, forestry, fishing,
tourism); susceptibility to the vagaries of international trade;
lack of economies of scale; high transportation and
communication costs; extreme vulnerability to natural
disasters; scarce land resources; and ever increasing
pressures on coastal and marine environments. Therefore,
rising sea levels potentially threaten all coastal regions in
Central America. The following sections specifically address
the various trends of sea level rise as a result of temperature
increase over the past two decades.

14

Figure 3: Local Trends in Sea Level determined over an
18 year (1992 - 2010) Period.

15

Predicted Water Shortages on Agriculture and Food
Security
Changes in temperature and precipitation in Central America
will very likely decrease the cover of vegetation that protects
the ground surface from wind and water erosion in certain
areas, turning currently productive farmland into an
ecological disaster similar to the dust bowl experienced in
the American and Canadian prairies in the 1930s. Studies
have shown that climate change associated with increasing
levels of carbon dioxide is likely to affect developed and
developing
countries
differentially,
with
major
19
vulnerabilities occurring in low-latitude regions. In certain
regions, the risk of crop failure on a year-to-year basis is
likely to increase. According to the UNFCCC, a possible
manifestation of the impact of climate change on small states
includes a shortening of the sugar cane growing season in
Belize, which could result in an acceleration of maturation
that would reduce yields by up to about 30 per cent.
Developing countries already struggle with large and
growing populations, and malnutrition rates would be
particularly vulnerable to changes in food production.20
Changes in the distribution of plant pests have implications
for food safety. Ocean warming would increase the number
of temperature-sensitive toxins produced by phytoplankton,
causing contamination of seafood more often at an increased
frequency of poisoning. Control of ambient conditions in the
food production process, including animal husbandry and

19

V. Ramaswamy and J.R. Christy, "Temperature Trends in the Lower
Atmosphere: Steps for Understanding and Reconciling Differences,"
January 2010, (United States Global Climate Change Science Program),
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap1-1/finalreport/sap1-1final-all.pdf.
20
Anthony J. McMichael and R. Sari Kovats, "Climate Change and
Climate Variability: Adaptatins to Reduce Adverse Health."
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 61.1 (2000): 49-64.
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slaughtering, to avoid the adverse effects of climate change
is highly recommended.21
Forests are defined by the Land Use, Land Use Change and
Forestry (LULUCF) as tree crown coverage of between 10 30% with trees that are between 2 – 5 meters tall over a
minimum area of 0.05 – 1.0 hectares. Afforestation,
reforestation, deforestation and forest management provide
relatively low cost opportunities to combat climate change
by serving as a carbon sink for removal of greenhouse gases.
Afforestation addresses land that has not been forested for at
least 50 years, whereas reforestation is confined to land that
was not forested as of December 31, 1989.
Based on
NASA Landsat satellite imagery from 1980 – 201022,
Belize’s forest cover has declined from 75.9% in 1980 to
62.7% as of late February 2010. Average annual
deforestation was estimated at 0.6%, equaling the clearing of
some 24,835 acres (9,982 hectares) of forest per year.
Protected areas have helped to conserved forests, with only a
small percent of forests being cleared within the past thirty
years, as compared with a quarter of forests outside of
protected areas during the period.

21

Ana R. Moreno, ―Climate Change and Human Health in Latin
America: Drivers, Effects, and Policies‖, Reg Environ Change, 6, pp.
157-164, 2006.
http://www.environmentalexpert.com/Files/0/articles/8845/Climatechang
eandhumanhealth.pdf.
22
E.R. Anderson, E.A Cherrington, A.I. Flores, J.B. Perez, R. Carrillo,
Carrillo R., and E. Sempris. 2008. "Potential Impacts of Climate Change
on Biodiversity in Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican
Republic." CATHALAC / USAID. Panama City, Panama.
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Figure 4: Decline of Belize’s Forest Cover from 1980 to
201023

23

Galindo L., op. cit.
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Water Resources and Water Security
Annual precipitation in parts of Latin America is predicted to
decrease as climate change worsens, and there is some
evidence that this has begun to happen. In other areas, access
to potable water is threatened whenever major flooding or
landslides occur as evidenced in Belize, Guatemala and
Honduras. As such, whether water supply is threatened by
excess precipitation or by droughts, many countries have
taken measures to ensure an adequate supply of water.
Nicaragua for example, has plans to build infrastructure to
store rainwater, to increase water security in times of
drought. An example of situations to be avoided in Central
America is a reduction in quality and quantity of water due
to climate change, as has happened in Bolivia. This
prompted an attempt of privatization of water in two of the
three largest cities, Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto, which
led to civil unrest.24 The two concessions to foreign private
companies in the respective cities were prematurely ended in
2000 and 2006 respectively. This is a glaring example where,
a multinational corporation seized an opportunity to provide
a commodity from what was perceived by locals, as a
naturally inherited resource (water), which threatened the
national security of Bolivia.
Impact of Climate Change on Ecosystems
Biodiversivity (the variety of all forms of life, from genes to
species to ecosystems) is a fundamental building block of
many of the services that ecosystems provide. Biodiversity
contributes to the function of an ecosystem and is difficult or
impossible to recover or replace once it has eroded. 25 In an
24

Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change, (Alexandria,Va.: CAN) April 2007.
25
Peter Backlund, et al., 2008. "The Effects of Climate Change on
Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the
United States," Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3 Report by the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global
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analysis of 866 peer-reviewed papers exploring the
ecological consequences of climate change worldwide,
nearly 60% of the 1,598 species studied exhibited shifts in
their distributions and/or timing of their annual cycles that
correspond to large-scale climate change patterns.
Maintaining the integrity of ecosystems, such as forest
habitat and wetlands, can provide defense against outbreaks
of the opportunists that carry diseases, and provide a buffer
against climate vagaries and extremes, whether or not there
is any change in the overall climate regime. Early
interventions can save money and lives.26 Mangrove
accretion on land may or may not be able to keep pace with
rising sea levels, depending on the composition of the forest,
tidal range and sediment supply. Mangrove forests could be
lost with a one meter rise in sea level in some states.
Climate Change Severity Index
Dynamics and impacts of climate change involve complex
feedback loops driven by human-produced greenhouse gases
emitted into the atmosphere; therefore, it is necessary to
develop models that demonstrate potential scenarios in the
future. The most sophisticated models include the flow of
atmosphere, oceanic, glacial, and terrestrial energy and mass.
Each of these models is run numerous times under different
conditions, as defined by Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios (SRFS), prepared for IPCC. These scenarios
represent best case and worst case scenarios under different
circumstances in which the population, economy,
technology, energy, and land-use, change and grow with
time. Consequently, development interests can be more
directed at increasing human wealth, or they can be more
Change Research and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research.
June, 2010; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
26
Paul R. Epstein, "Climate, Ecology and Human Health,‖
Consequences: The Nature and Implications of Environmental Change,
1997;3(2), U.S. Global Research Information Office.
http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/vol3no2/climhealth.html.
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concerned with fostering a sustainable future by preserving
the environment.
Anderson et al.27 assessed the potential impacts of climate
change on the biodiversity of Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama by
identifying the critical habitats: places where climate change
is projected to most greatly threaten biodiversity. This model
describes the spatial distribution of ecosystems in terms of a
Climate Change Severity Index (CCSI).
CCSI is a measure of how far a location will be placed
outside of its current climate comfort zone. It is constructed
utilizing baseline climate data and derived monthly anomaly
data. The spatial scales depend on the detail of the available
climate data and the raw quantitative values are interpreted
as shown in Table 2:
Table 2: Range and Significance of CCSI Values 28
Values
0 - 0.24

Severity
Low severity

0.25 - 0.49

Approaching significant changes

0.5 - 0.74

Significant changes vary during year

0.75 - 0.99

Pushing comfort zone limits

1.00 -1.99

Outside comfort zone

2.00+

Far outside comfort zone

27

E.R. Anderson, E.A Cherrington, A.I. Flores, J.B. Perez, R. Carrillo,
Carrillo R., and E. Sempris. 2008, opp cit.
28
Galindo L., op. cit.
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The CCSI itself is derived from two variables: Temperature
Change Severity Index and a Precipitation Change Severity
Index.
Temperature Change Severity Index (CCSIt): =

Precipitation Change Severity Index (CCSIp): =

and Climate Change Severity Index (CCSI): =

The potential impact of climate change within a given
ecosystem depends on its elevation because vegetation at
lower altitude has a higher risk of being impacted.
Furthermore, significant consideration is given to ecosystems
of very small extents with a very high average CCSI. The
impact of climate change on species-rich ecosystems and
Central America can be assessed in terms of a worst case or
a best case scenario as depicted in Figure 5.

22

Figure 5: Conceptual Breakdown of Climate Change for
Best and Worst Case Scenarios29

Best Case
Sustainable Development Human Equity

Emissions Drivers
Population
Economy
Technology
Energy
Agriculture
Worst
Case
Unsustainable and(Land-use)
unequal economic growth

The following maps (Figure 6) display climate change
severity index in terms of vegetation/land cover for the best
case and worst case scenarios in Central America by the
2020s and 2050s.

29

Anderson E.R., op. cit.
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Figure 6: Climate change Severity Index in 2020s; (a)
Best Case Scenario and (b) Worst Case Scenario30

(a)

(b)
30

Ibid.
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Figure 7: Climate change Severity Index in 2050s; (a)
Best Case Scenario and (b) Worst Case Scenario31

(a)

(b)

31

Ibid.

25

While only a few countries Belize, Nicaragua and Honduras
have the higher severity classes, in the best case scenario, by
2020 every country is projected to experience these changes,
except for Guatemala. Therefore, the aforementioned
projections suggest that in the light of the fact that
Guatemala is the most unstable and the poorest in the
hemisphere, government officials while being cognizant of
the effects of climate change, may well devote fewer
resources to mitigation efforts. As shown in Figure 7, it is
possible that movement outside of the comfort zone will
occur somewhere in every Central American country.
Figure 8: Average Climate Change Severity Index per
Vegetation/Land Cover, Worst Case Scenario in the
2020s32

It should be noted that the CCSI maps depicted above do not
locate actual ecosystems where climate change is projected
to be more severe. However, the following graphs provide
trends of the potential impact of climate change on species-

32

Ibid. Pg. 35-36

26

rich ecosystems in terms of vegetation/land cover and
altitude under worst case scenarios by the 2020s.
Figure 9: Average Climate Change Severity Index per
Altitudinal Level, Worst Case Scenario in the 2020s.33

As seen in Figure 8, most ecosystems except for shrub land
will experience some conditions far outside their comfort
zone under the worst scenario in the 2020s. Broadleaf forests
and agriculture, in particular have the highest percentage of
climate changes that are projected to move outside of the
comfort zone.
Savannas and mangroves also have
considerable amounts of highly susceptible areas. It is
evident from the ecosystem map that shrub land, broadleaf
forests, and agriculture are the most extensive land cover
types and that nearly a quarter of the broadleaf forests have a
high severity index. Additionally, there is cause for concern
that 30% of agricultural areas are also projected to
experience highly severe climatic changes.

33

Ibid. Pg. 36-37
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In terms of altitude, there seems to be a decreasing trend of
severity with increasing elevation. This is most likely
because ecosystems at higher altitudes are more adaptable to
greater ranges in temperature; thus, they could potentially be
more resilient to the changes in climate.
In the worst case scenario, projected climate change with
altitude approaches the comfort zone limits or is outside the
comfort zone (purple or red) in only submontane, lowlands
and unclassified altitudinal classes (Figure 9). As seen in
Figure 6 and 7, these classes of higher severity lie in parts of
Costa Rica, Panama and Nicaragua. Whereas, in the worst
case scenario, every class of vegetation or land cover type
except shrub land is projected to experience movements
outside of the comfort zone (Figure 7).
POLICY RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Under the Kyoto Protocol, there are three mechanisms by
which GHGs can be reduced, namely Clean Development
Mechanism (dedicated for developing countries), Emissions
Trading (Cap-and-Trade) and Joint Implementation, which
allows Annex 1 countries with reduction commitments to
invest in projects that reduce emissions in other Annex 1
countries.
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
The CDM was established by Article 12 of the Kyoto
Protocol of the UNFCCC to enable developed countries to
offset their emissions by funding climate change mitigation
projects in non-Annex 1 countries. In particular, project
investments must contribute to sustainable development in
the host country, and must be independently certified in
terms of ―certified emission reductions‖ or CERs.34 A CER
34
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is a tradable unit issued by the United Nations (UN) through
the CDM and is equal to one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent
of GHG emissions reduction.
CERs have become a commodity, which can be bought and
sold in a new environmental market, for example at the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which is a voluntary
GHG emissions cap-and-trade scheme based in North
America. As such, the dictates of this market has led to
daunting challenges for smaller economies, particularly those
without international connections. For example, transaction
costs for implementation of the CDM are cost prohibitive for
smaller economies. Additionally, only large scale operations
in agroforestry, integrated rural forestry and energy related
projects meet the CDM requirements. Furthermore, there is
what is referred to as ―people issues‖35 that are byproducts of
CDM investment projects that could have potential negative
impacts on local food security and development options.
Large forest sinks could run counter to other sustainable
development initiatives seeking goods and services from
forests that may be benefitting poor and forest-dependent
people.
CDM has been operational since the beginning of 2006 with
over 4,200 registered projects. Of those registered, over
1,000 projects could lead to certified emission reduction,
(one tonne of CO2 = 1CER) of more than 2.9 billion tonnes
of CO2 equivalent in the first commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol, 2008–2012. CDM is the only flexible
mechanism available to Caribbean nations for emissionreduction (or emission removal) projects to earn CER credits.
These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by
<http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti
cle&id=1440%3Acancun-climate-conference-some-keyissues&catid=129%3Aclimate-change-&Itemid=67&lang=en>.
35
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Environmental Change, 14.1 (2004): 53-67.
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industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism
stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions,
while providing industrialized countries some flexibility in
meeting their emission reduction limitation targets.
In Copenhagen in December 2009, developed countries
committed to provide approximately $30 billion to
developing countries to mitigate climate change effects
between 2010 and 2012 for the most vulnerable countries,
with a mid-term goal of 100 billion dollars a year by 2020.
Furthermore, this money would be "new and additional,"
meaning that it was money, which had not been announced
before. 'Additional' implied the funds would be additional to
developed countries pre-existing aid commitments.
However, nine months into 2010, developed countries have
not lived up to their pledges. In fact, on a Netherlands
published voluntary database where governments can
disclose details on meeting their pledges, only six countries
have put information on this website, and not all have
forthwith on full details of their spending (World
Development Movement). A CDM project activity might
involve, for example, a rural electrification project using
solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient
boilers. Energy projects, agro-forestry and integrated rural
forestry have considerable livelihood benefits. However,
only large scale operations will meet CDM requirements. For
example, Norway has agreed to pay Guyana up to $250
million for anti-deforestation measures that could lead to
decreased greenhouse gas emissions. In order to be
considered for registration, a project must first be approved
by the Designated National Authority (DNA) that is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that the CDM project
contributes to the country’s sustainable development.
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Financial and Market Barriers to CDM
For smaller nations to take advantage of CDM, many
challenges must be addressed. These include low
economies of scale for renewable energy projects as
compared with high transaction costs associated with
developing a Project Development Design (PDD) report.
Also, high transportation costs for travelling between
countries to monitor and verify projects impose high
implementation and operational barriers. In general, there is
a lack of local accredited verifiers and in some cases, there
is no DNA to oversee domestic CDM project activities.
Furthermore, carbon funds are not readily available for
small projects because focus has been placed on large
projects. It is assumed, that as the global CDM market
evolves, it may follow the path of foreign direct investment
where the bulk of funding goes to a few larger developing
countries with the infrastructure and institutions available
to manage larger projects. The following chart documents
the process for establishing a CDM project.
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Figure 10: A CDM Project Cycle

Factors affecting CDM costs include: delivery risk
associated with the host country, such as project financial
and operational risks; availability of expertise within the host
country (for example DOEs); and risks associated with the
wider social impact of the project. For example, large forest
sinks run counter to other sustainable development initiates
seeking goods and services from the forest that may be
benefiting the poor and forest-dependent people. There are
also potential negative impacts on local food security and
development options. To some extent, the more experience a
country has with hosting CDM projects, the easier it is for
the next developer to conduct business there.
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Financial Options for CDM Projects
Developing countries will have to take steps to find
portfolio investors via the prototype carbon fund of the
World Bank and other Development Assistance funding
sources to link up with active development initiatives and
attract CDM projects. One solution to the transaction cost
dilemma is to use International Development Assistance
funds to establish third party involvement through the
implementation of a Climate Change & Clean
Development Consortia comprising NGOs, Development
Banks and/or Government Extension Services network.
This will strengthen the capacities of climate centers to be
able to generate and disseminate reliable climate
information as well as enhance the capacities of country’s
policy makers to be able to integrate the information into
development planning. This will also provide consistent
management and a financial and administrative system for
cost-benefit sharing among many small players.
CAP-and-Trade Versus Carbon Tax
Cap-and-trade is a market-based approach suggested as a
means to control pollution by providing economic incentives
in order to reduce emissions of pollutants. A central
authority or governmental body sets the limit (cap) on the
amount of a pollutant that can be emitted. The limit is
allocated or sold to other companies/agencies through
emissions permits, representing the right to discharge a
specific volume of the specified pollutant. Firms are then
required to hold a number of permits, or carbon credits
equivalent to their emissions, however the total number of
permits cannot exceed the cap, thus limiting total emissions
to that level. By transferring, or ―trading‖ these permits, a
company can effectively pay a charge for polluting, while
the seller is rewarded for having reduced emissions.
Theoretically, this market-based approach allows those who
33

can reduce emissions most inexpensively to do so, while
achieving pollution reduction at the lowest cost to society.
Using this market approach, a ―Cap‖ is designated as a limit
placed on emissions for a measured/compliance period from
―covered sources‖ where a ―credit‖ can be either of two
carbon commodities, an ―allowance‖, or an ―offset.‖
Allowances are allocated to covered sources, whereas offsets
come from projects in uncovered sources. An Offset Credit
is a tradable commodity that represents a reduction,
avoidance or sequestration of 1 tonne of CO2 or equivalent
GHG. In a voluntary or mandatory cap-and-trade scenario
for example, it can be derived from a project in a noncovered sector, such as agriculture or forestry. Covered
sources can design their own compliance strategy, such as,
reduce emissions to the cap, reduce below cap and sell
unused allowances to others, or purchase offset credits and
emit above cap. Emitters and other project developers can
create offset credits to be used, banked or traded on an
exchange.
According to Clifton36, the current obsession with carbon
trading as a primary tool for tackling climate change is high
risk, irresponsible and dangerous. It is a distraction from
more viable, more equitable, more effective solutions for
tackling greenhouse gas emissions and providing adequate
finance to developing countries for tackling climate change
and adapting to its impacts. Carbon trading is unreliable,
unproven and burdens developing countries with unfair
responsibility for tackling climate change. The barriers to
reforming carbon trading are insurmountable in practice
within the time we have available to avoid catastrophic
climate change. In addition, carbon market offsets are not a
legitimate source of climate finance, and cannot guarantee a
36
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predictable flow of finance to developing countries. This
type of finance rarely supports genuine low carbon
development. The biggest financial beneficiary of carbon
trading is the Northern carbon trading industry.
Cap-and-Trade is a complex system that is not transparent
and has the potential for fraud. Nevertheless, it results in a
steadily decreasing cap. As the market sets the price, there is
always the potential for volatility. Whereas, a carbon tax
system could be quickly implemented as the Government
sets the price. It is more predictable, transparent and void of
incentive to defraud. However, a steadily increasing tax can
be expected.
RECOMMENDATIONS
With funding from agencies such as the World Bank, the
European Investment Bank (EIB) and European
Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) (the latter parties
intend to establish an investment matching facility to invest
in private sector climate change projects in Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific, Asia and Latin America before
the end of 2010) and others, technical cooperation projects
could be funded to achieve the following:





Conduct Greenhouse gas inventories of selected
industrial sectors. This will help a country to track its
greenhouse gas emission levels.
Identify companies to finance all or co-finance part
of a CDM project in return for full or shared financial
returns and CERs.
A company financially
contributes towards the cost of a CDM project equal
to some portion of the incremental cost of the project
over and above the baseline technology, or finances
the removal of market barriers, in return for CERs.
Identify companies to provide loan or lease financing
at concessional rates in return for CERs.
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Develop a Caribbean regional advisory body to
provide assistance to Caribbean countries.
Establish sustainable development criteria and
provide other technical assistance.
Develop a consistent host country approval process
Provide recommendations regarding individual
project approval.
Develop specific CDM infrastructure and expertise
for Caribbean countries.
Create Credit Facility for funding CDM projects
utilizing renewable energy services such as solar
LED lighting, solar water pumping, solar cookers and
energy efficient biomass stoves and biomass
gasifiers.
Create specific carbon funding facility for the
Caribbean region to enable accessibility and decrease
competition with larger economies.
Assist project
developers to implement CDM
projects, monitor and report on the progress of the
projects in order to reduce transaction costs.
Develop capacity of UNFCCC focal points in the
small islands developing states in order to establish
and set up functions of a DNA for the host countries.
Develop separate funds for mitigation activities.
Utilize solar industry's potential to create jobs that
help to reduce emissions, e.g. Europe's industry
group said electricity from solar panels could
feasibly make up 20 percent of the supply for the
European Union by 2020.

CONCLUSION
Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest
development gains that can be realized by some regions
could be reversed by climate change. This means that
climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat
as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental
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disaster that is unfolding. As such, addressing climate
change has become central to the development and poverty
reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions.
Poorer countries and communities in Central America will
suffer the hardest because of weaker resilience and greater
reliance on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture. The
US should attempt to deliver capability to assist these states
to deal with the effects of climate change.
Central America will have to establish financial banking
mechanisms that recognize and reward carbon sinks
provided by agro-ecosystems and renewable energy systems.
The CDM projects addressing climate change would ensure
alignment with each country’s and regional priorities, as well
as recipient participation in its identification, development
and approval process. CDM funding should build on already
existing mechanisms thereby promoting efficiency and
accelerated results. Through both the public and private
sector, CDM projects associated with renewable energy
projects,
energy
efficiency,
forestry,
sustainable
transportation and climate change adaptation projects could
be designed to build resilience and place the nations on a low
carbon-intensive growth trajectory.
It is critical that the transition to a low-carbon economy,
while driven by the need for environmental justice, does not
in itself lead to further economic and social injustices.
Policies and measures to address greenhouse gas emissions
and support economic transition must ensure job creation,
protect pay conditions, ensure health and safety for workers
and respect and promote the rights of local communities and
indigenous peoples. It should protect low-income groups,
and guard against the creation of further economic and social
injustice. Most importantly it should also ensure good
governance, including participation of affected workers and
communities in the development of policies and measures to
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tackle climate change, and transparency, accountability and
democratic control over decision making.37
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